THERE
is agreement that macroeconomic is-1 sues "matter" for political evaluations, but how they matter is not fully understood. Differing theoretical perspectives underlie some disagreements, and inherent data limitations have provided further obstacles to consensus. This paper focuses on issues related to data limitations and adopts a method for efficiently using data which are available. By empirically linking the time series for an incumbent party's vote share to key economic indicators, one can gain information about how voters evaluate economic performance. In wellknown studies, Kramer (1971) and Fair (1978 Fair ( , 1982 Fair ( , 1988 have analyzed congressional and presidential elections in this manner. Other studies of U.S. voting outcomes have also followed this general research strategy. ' Despite the appeal of this method, one limitation is notable. If one restricts attention to the post-war period for the United States, there are only 11 observations for presidential election outcomes, and only 22 observations for congressional elections. It is difficult to draw clear inferences about the influence of economic events on elections given this paucity of data. Fair and Kramer tackled this problem by expanding their sample periods backward in time. For example, Fair (1988) makes use of 18 presidential election observations beginning with the 1916 election. This modestly expands the sample but it also introduces additional perils. Economic data are less reliable for the pre-war period, and voter attitudes about government responsibility for economic conditions are likely to have changed over the course of the century. The idiosyncrasies of two world wars and an unparalleled depression also lead one to question the appropriateness of including earlier observations.
Other researchers have avoided the observation shortage problem by investigating an alternative time series: poll evaluations of presidential performance. For about 40 years, the Gallup Poll has periodically asked respondents whether they approve or disapprove of the incumbent president's handling of his job. Survey results are available for quarterly (or even more frequent) periods, and provide a reasonably long time series which can be linked to economic performance indicators. Many studies have done so; Hibbs (1982a Hibbs ( , 1982b Hibbs ( , 1987 
Note that the wois appear in both vote and approval equations, implying that voters and poll respondents use the same standards in evaluating economic performance. This restriction can be tested empirically. Also note that the scale of the linear combination defining St is arbitrary; I will normalize by setting b = 1 in equation (3a). The likelihood function for the model described above is provided in appendix 1.
Serial correlation of the errors is a potential problem for the approval ratings equation, and the estimation procedure should account for this possibility. Although errors within an administration's tenure are probably correlated there is little reason to believe that the error for the last quarter of an outgoing administration will be correlated with the error for the succeeding administration in its first quarter in office. Letting Et represent the composite error term for the approval ratings equation, I respecify the error process as follows:
where Dt equals one if the administration in office at time t was also in office at time t -1, and is otherwise equal to zero, p is the autocorrelation coefficient, and et is an error term with the properties attributed to it earlier in equation (la). With a data transformation analogous to that used in handling standard first order serial correlation problems, the approval ratings equation can be rewritten in a form in which serial correlation is absent. Consider an equation: I A detailed discussion of specification issues related to noneconomic variables is provided in that paper. 12 Fair considers Ford a non-incumbent in constructing this variable; however, I have coded Ford as an incumbent.
13 Some approval ratings were available for the Truman years; however, polls were not reported with regularity until the Eisenhower presidency.
14 The standard errors reported here are estimated by the method proposed by White (1982) . Inferences are robust to some specification errors when this method is employed. Robustness of the results to alternative specifications is, as always, an issue of concern. In this paper I have not searched for a "best" specification of economic performance indicators; rather I have selected a specification which is broadly representative of the existing literature.15 Whether alternative models of voter behavior would lead to different implications about the consistency of the behavior patterns producing voting and approval rates provides a question for future research efforts. I have, however, done some sensitivity testing with alternative specifications of the noneconomic variables in the approval ratings equation. These tests will be briefly described here; detailed results are available from the author upon request.
I first considered variations in the handling of honeymoon effects and political events. Omitting any or all of the political events variables has no substantive effects on reported results, nor does replacing the series of honeymoon dummies with a declining linear trend over the early quarters of a president's tenure. In each case, the cross-equation restrictions implying behavioral consistency cannot be rejected.
I next replaced the president-specific intercepts with a common intercept and a party dummy. 
IV. Summary and Conclusions
In this paper I have jointly estimated equations explaining presidential voting and presidential approval ratings, treating the equations as seemingly unrelated regressions with unequal numbers of observations. My results are broadly consistent with previous voting and approval rating studies of Fair, Hibbs, and others. GNP growth and inflation appear to matter for both voters and poll respondents; evidence of unemployment effects is weak. Since the results are qualitatively 15 I have also estimated a model dropping the insignificant unemployment variable, obtaining results similar to those described here. 16 For the Wald test of the hypothesis of equal w1s across equations we obtain A, = 13.128 > 9.21 = Xo299(2); the hypothesis is rejected.
17 For a Wald test of the hypothesis of stable coefficients for the economic variables in pre-war and post-war periods, we obtain Aw = 3.60 < 6.25 = Xo.90(3); the hypothesis is not rejected. However, in results for the extended sample, the unemployment coefficient in the voting equation has an implausible positive sign. If unemployment is dropped from the model, then inflation coefficients differ significantly over the pre-war and post-war periods, and stability of the vote function is rejected. similar for voters and poll respondents, it appears that the poll results provide meaningful evaluations which are related to voting decisions.
The results also point to some differences in the behavior of voters and poll respondents, however. Estimates consistently, if not strongly, indicate that poll respondents are more concerned with inflation and less concerned with GNP growth than voters are. The hypothesis that voters and poll respondents employ identical standards in evaluating economic performance is not rejected in the original specification, but can be rejected in some plausible reformulations of the model. Given these results it is reasonable to remain cautious regarding the interchangeability of voting data and poll data.
When considering why voting and approval ratings might differ in their responses to economic indicators, distinctions between retrospective and prospective considerations are likely to be important. The focus of the approval question on job performance may encourage retrospective evaluations, while voting may be more heavily influenced by prospective criteria. If recent GNP growth is a better "leading indicator" than the rate of inflation, then the results reported here are consistent with a more prospective outlook by voters.
APPENDIX 1 Likelihood Function for the Voting and Approval Ratings Model
Below I provide the log-likelihood function for individual observations under 3 cases: (1) the presidential vote is observed, but an approval rating is not observed, (2) there is no presidential election, but an approval rating is observed, and (3) both the presidential vote and an approval rating are observed. First define e * and u * as follows: 
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